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Abstract:  
This article explores the determinants of working poverty in the European Union. At the 
individual and household level, the factors contributing to working poverty differ in importance 
across countries. Nonetheless, being a lone parent, having low education, having a temporary 
contract, working part-time or less than full-year, appear to be the most important risk factors. 
Low pay, under-employment and family structures combine to explain working poverty. At the 
national level, the correlation between poverty and in-work poverty is strong: countries with low 
levels of in-work poverty are also the ones which keep overall poverty low. At this level there 
does not appear to be a dilemma between fighting in-work poverty and overall poverty. The 
strongest determinant contribution to low in-work poverty is high social spending as a proportion 
of GDP. The level of spending is more important than the way the spending is done or financed: 
both the social democratic and the social assurance regimes have good performances in terms of 
in-work poverty. Women’s employment rate, which is generally viewed as being a factor in 
keeping in-work poverty low, is no more significant when level of social spending is taken into 
account. This underlines the ambiguous effect of employment on in-work poverty: employment 
can lift households out of poverty but it can also increase the number of poor workers.  
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Introduction:  
Promoting participation in employment is part of the EU strategy to fight the risk of poverty and 
social exclusion. Promoting a high level of employment is also at the heart of the Lisbon strategy 
in order “for the European Union to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion”. The European employment strategy states that labour market policies 
should be combined with an active inclusion strategy in order to fight poverty. The Council of the 
European Union recommends a balanced approach in its employment report (Council, 2008): 
member countries should on one hand make work more attractive than benefits and on the other 
hand create opportunities for the low-skilled. The integration into the labour market is supposed 
to increase social inclusion and improve the sustainability of social protection systems.  
 
However, whereas it was assumed in the past that employment was a good protection against 
poverty, the debate around in-work poverty has increased in recent years. Obviously, working is 
not always sufficient to escape poverty: particular family structures, less than full-time work and 
low pay can explain the development of in-work poverty. Since 2003, reducing working poverty 
has become a priority at the European Union level: the employment guidelines specifically 
recognized the need to tackle in-work poverty and new indicators were defined in the context of 
the Open Method of Coordination in order to apprehend the number of working poor and their 
characteristics (Bardone and Guiot, 2005). These indicators were added in 2003 to the original 
list of “Laeken indicators” on poverty and social exclusion developed by the European Council in 
2001 as part of the Lisbon Strategy.  
 
The measure of in-work poverty combines an individual and a household dimension: among the 
employed population, the working poor are those who live in a household whose equivalised 
disposable income is below 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income2. The 
employment status is determined on the basis of their “most frequent activity status”. Under this 
definition an individual is considered employed if he was working at least 15 hours a week for at 
                                                 
2 Equivalised income is defined as the household’s total income divided by its equivalent size, in order to take 
account of its size and composition. Eurostat uses the modified OECD equivalence scale that gives a weight of 1 to 
the first adult, 0.5 to other household members aged 14 years and over, and 0.3 to children below 14.  
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least 7 months of the year3. This concept is different from the active poor (which include the 
unemployed population) and the low-wage workers concepts. A worker can be considered as 
low-wage but not poor or conversely poor but not low-wage (if for example he is the only wage 
earner in a family with a lot of dependents). According to this definition, in-work poor 
represented 8% of the employed population in the European Union in 2006. People in 
employment are less at risk of poverty than the general population: 15% of the EU population 
was poor in 2006; the risk of poverty stood at 41% for the unemployed and 16% for the retired 
population. The working poor nonetheless represent around a quarter of the poor population aged 
16 and over and therefore should be an important policy concern.   
 
This article will explore the determinants of working poverty in the European Union. Existing 
studies focus on individual and household characteristics to explain working poverty at the 
household level. Comparative studies that relate working poverty with welfare regimes are rare. 
We aim in this article to identify relationships between welfare regimes and working poverty. We 
try to answer the following questions: what are the determinants of low working poverty at the 
country level? Which welfare regimes tackle working poverty best? What are the common 
characteristics of countries with low proportion of working poor?  
 
In a first section, we will examine which individual and household characteristics lead to working 
poverty in the EU member states. Section 2 deals with characteristics at the country level: which 
are associated with high and low levels of working poverty? Section 3 explores the relationships 
between welfare regimes and working poverty.  
 
 
Data:  
This study is based on the latest (2006) Eurostat data, unless otherwise mentioned. Eurostat 
launched EU-SILC (Community Statistics on Income and Living Conditions), an EU wide 
survey, in 2003 in order to collect harmonized data concerning Income and Living Conditions in 
the EU and calculate the so-called “Laeken” Indicators of Social Inclusion. The EU member 
                                                 
3 See Peña-Casas and Latta (2004), Chapter 1, for a discussion on the difficulties relating to the definition of the 
working poor 
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states plus Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey participate in this program. Bulgaria, 
Romania, Turkey and Switzerland have launched SILC in 2006 but data for these countries are 
not available yet. We therefore use data from 27 countries: the 25 EU member states in 2006 plus 
Iceland and Norway. EU-SILC operates under a framework regulation of the Council and the 
Parliament and a series of Commission implementing regulations. Data concerning labour market 
conditions are based on the results of the European Labour Force Survey (EU LFS). In-work 
poverty measures concern the population in working age (over 16 and under 65). For more 
information concerning the data source, see Eurostat (2007, 2008). EU-15 refers to the 15 
member states before the 2004 expansion, EU-25 to the 25 member states before the 2007 
enlargement; the coverage of this study will be referred as EU25+ (EU-25 + Iceland and 
Norway).    
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1. Incidence of in-work poverty risk and factors contributing to 
working poverty  
 
The European Union is not a homogeneous economic area: not surprisingly, the risk of in-work 
poverty differs greatly across member states (Figure 1). It stands at 8% in the European Union 
but is lowest in the Czech Republic (3%), Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Finland (4%). 
These countries, which are successful in keeping in-work poverty low, will be referred in this 
study, for practical purpose, as the “successful countries”. In contrast, Greece (14%), Poland 
(13%) and Portugal (11%) are the countries where the risk of working poverty is the highest.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Working poverty combines and individual and a household characteristic: it is therefore 
necessary to take both an individual and a household perspective when analysing the factors that 
increase the risk of being poor while working.  Table 1 presents the risk of in-work poverty risk 
by main characteristics of the employed population. The characteristics are divided in three 
categories reflecting the different dimensions of working poverty: personal, job and household 
characteristics. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
In the European Union as a whole, low education, having a temporary contract, working part-
time or less than full-year, being a lone parent are important risk factors. Conversely, sex and age 
do not seem to be important risk factors. There are risk factors in the three dimensions of working 
poverty (personal, job and household): low pay, under-employment and family structures 
combine to explain working poverty. Lone parents are particularly vulnerable to in-work poverty: 
17% of lone parents who work are poor in the EU-25. Household characteristics are therefore a 
key risk factor of working poverty. Bardone and Guio show that in 2001 sole earners with 
children in 2 adults or more households were even more vulnerable to working poverty: 20% of 
sole earners with children in the EU-15 were working poor against 19% of lone parents. The 
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authors conclude that “the most important risk factors of in-work poverty relate to the household 
situation of workers”.   
 
The factors contributing to working poverty differ in importance across the European countries. 
Gender is a more important factor in Italy, Greece, Spain, Malta and Poland than in other 
countries: in these countries, in-work poverty risk for men is higher than for women by at least 
three points. Greece, Italy and Spain are also the countries where the employment gap between 
men and women is highest: respectively 29.5%, 27.9% and 23.9%. If employed women are less 
likely than employed men to be poor, it is probably because women at risk of poverty (low 
qualification, high number of dependents) are less likely to work. In Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland and Norway), younger workers are sensibly more vulnerable than other 
workers. This is probably due to specific living arrangements of young people in Nordic 
countries where they are more likely to leave their parental home early. However, if the data 
underestimates family financial support of children living separately, then poverty of young 
people will be overestimated in countries where co-residence with parents is low. Similarly, the 
standard of living of families helping children living separately might be overestimated4. In 
Greece and Portugal, it is the eldest workers who are the most at risk. Education is important in 
every country but more particularly in the least developed European countries: Greece, Portugal 
and most Eastern European countries. Job characteristics are also important in every country. The 
differences between countries are not as marked. Having children make singles more vulnerable 
to “in-work” poverty except in Denmark and Finland. Similarly couples with children are more at 
risk than the overall population except in Germany, Sweden and Norway.  
 
Table 2 presents the risk of in-work poverty and the share of in-work poor by household type. In-
work poverty does not have the same face across European countries: it results from very 
different living arrangements. The share of single adults with no children in the working poor 
population is much more important in the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) 
and Germany than in other countries: they account for more than 30% of the working poor in 
                                                 
4 Since poverty is measured at the household level, it is assumed that solidarity is total among member of the same 
household. Conversely, it is likely that parental financial transfers are underreported in living condition surveys such 
as EU-SILC. The differences in terms of standard of living and poverty levels that are the consequences of living 
arrangements of young people are therefore partly statistical constructions.     
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these five countries (41% in Denmark) against 15% in the EU25. This type of household 
represents a higher share of working poverty in these five countries because the poverty risk 
differential relative to other households is higher but also because they represent a higher share of 
the population: 22% of the population live in single adult households in Denmark, 20% in 
Norway and Sweden, and 18% in Finland and Germany against 13% in the EU25. If single 
parents face higher risk of in-work poverty in all countries, their share in the working poor 
population differ mainly because their weight in the overall population vary from country to 
country: they represent only a very small part of the population in Greece, Spain (2%), Italy, 
Portugal, and Slovenia (3%), but a much higher in Ireland, the United Kingdom, Sweden and 
Iceland (8%). Consequently, their weight in the working poor population is more than twice the 
EU25 average (11%) in Ireland, Iceland and Sweden as well as in Estonia where their in-work 
poverty risk is particularly high. More than half (53%) of the working poor in the European 
Union belong to households with 2 or more adults and dependent children. This proportion is 
especially high in Malta (81%), Poland (74%), Slovakia (70%) and Spain (67%).   
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Part-time employees are more vulnerable to in-work poverty in all European countries except 
Belgium where their poverty risk is equally low (4%) than for the overall employed population 
(Table 3). There are wide differences between European countries in the way part-time 
employment and in-work poverty inter-relates. In most eastern European countries part-time 
employment is much lower than the EU25 average (19%): even though their risk of in-work 
poverty is higher, the share of working poor working part-time is relatively low. It is, to a lesser 
extent, also the case of southern European countries. Conversely, part-time employment is a more 
important concern in the United Kingdom: in-work poverty risk is 50% higher than national 
average for part-time employees who also represent a higher share of employment (26%) than on 
average in the EU25 (19%). Consequently, part time employees account for 45% of in-work poor 
in the UK against 27% in the EU25.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
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The working poor concept differs from the low-wage concept: while working poor combines both 
an individual and a household dimension, low wage is intrinsically individual. According to 
Eurostat’s definition, a low-wage employee is an employee working at least 15 hours a week 
whose wage is below 60% of the national median monthly wages. If all households were 
composed only of employed workers earning the same wages then every low pay employees 
would be poor and every poor would be low pay. Table 4a&b show how the concepts were 
intertwined in 1996. Table 4a shows the proportion of working poor and low pay employees as  
% of all employees, the proportion of working poor among low-pay employees and the 
proportion of low-pay employees among working poor for EU-15 countries less Sweden and 
Finland. In table 4b, the employees are divided in 4 categories depending on their low-pay and 
working poor status. In the studied countries, 20% of low-wage employees were poor and 37% of 
working poor were low-wage. Being low-wage is therefore an important contributing factor to in-
work poverty but not a decisive one. We calculated odds ratio (table 4b) as a measure of the 
interdependence of the two notions: an odds ratio of 1 means independence and the greater the 
odds ratio the stronger the relationship between the two groups. Among the studied countries, it is 
in Greece and France that the notions of low wage and working poor are the most related: the 
relative risk of being working poor among the low-wage compared to the non low-wage is the 
greatest in these two countries. Conversely, it is in the Netherlands and Spain where the 
relationship between the two notions is the weakest. Ireland and the UK are also below average 
whereas Belgium, Austria, Germany and Portugal are above average.  
 
Although contributing factors have different intensity depending on the studied country, in-work 
poverty always has the same sources: particular family structures, low-wage, part-time and 
unstable jobs. This is not surprising considering the definition of in-work poverty (a working 
individual in a poor household): everything else being equal, what makes the household poorer 
(less work and pay, more dependents) will increase the risk of in-work poverty.  
 
[Table 4a and b here] 
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2. Working poor in the European Union: a comparative analysis 
perspective.  
Which characteristics are related to working poverty at the national level? Before an analysis in 
terms of welfare regimes (section 3), we look at the institutional variables that are linked with in-
work poverty.   
 
Figure 2 shows the correlation between poverty (at a 60% level) and working poverty. The 
correlation is positive and rather strong (R2=0.53): working poverty is highest in countries with 
high poverty. At this level, there does not seem to be a dilemma - or tension - between fighting 
poverty in general and fighting in-work poverty. On the contrary, countries which do well in 
fighting poverty (the Czech Republic, the Netherlands) do also well in keeping in-work poverty 
low. Countries below the regression line do comparatively better against in-work poverty than 
poverty in general: this is the case of Belgium and Romania and, to a lesser extent, Ireland, 
Finland, Denmark and the Czech Republic. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the poverty 
rate before social transfers (pensions excluded) and in-work poverty risk: the two variables are 
not correlated (R2=0.003). This means that the correlation between poverty and working poverty 
is the consequence of social transfers: social transfers that are effective in fighting poverty are 
also effective in fighting in-work poverty; the hypothesis that there is no dilemma between the 
two public policy goals is confirmed by this data in the European Union context. Of course, when 
designing specific public policies to fight poverty, policy makers might have to choose between 
instruments that are more effective in fighting either working poverty or poverty in general. 
However, the countries that reduce poverty by social transfers the most are also the ones with the 
lowest risk of in-work poverty. Figure 4 shows the relationship between in-work poverty risk and 
the percentage reduction of poverty by social transfers: the correlation is strong (R2 = 0.45).  
 
[Figure 2, 3 and 4 here] 
 
How does social spending reduce in-work poverty? Figure 5 graphs the relationship between 
social spending (excluding pensions) and in-work poverty. There is a relatively strong correlation 
(R2 = 0.25): the countries which spend most on social budgets (sickness, invalidity, 
 11
unemployment, family, housing, social exclusion) are also the ones with the lowest risk of in-
work poverty. Among the successful countries, the Czech Republic stands out: in-work poverty is 
the lowest in the EU25+ whereas its social spending is below average. Amongst the country with 
high in-work poverty, Greece and Poland have poor results relative to their level of spending. The 
Baltic countries have low social spending and high in-work poverty.  
 
[Figure 5 here] 
 
There is a relatively strong correlation (R2=0.23) between the employment rate for women and 
in-work poverty (Figure 6). This relationship was emphasized by Cazenave (2006). In theory, 
high employment has an ambiguous effect on working poverty risk. On the one hand, the highest 
the work intensity at the household level, the lowest the risk of in-work poverty5, but on the other 
hand, reducing the employment of people with high poverty risk might lower the risk of in-work 
poverty. This might explain why the correlation between working poverty and men’s 
employment is weaker than the one between working poverty and women’s employment (Figure 
7). Since men are more likely to work than women, non-employment of men in couples is much 
less likely to result in in-work poverty of their spouse (because they are less likely to work) than 
non-employment of women. Belgium and the Czech Republic on the one hand and Poland and 
Greece on the other hand stand out; the first two because of lower working poverty than predicted 
by the regression while the later have higher working poverty rates. The figure also reveals two 
clusters of countries each with a geographical intruder: on the successful hand, the Nordic 
countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland) and the Netherlands; and on the other hand 
the Mediterranean countries (Spain, Italy and Greece) and Poland. Western and Eastern 
continental countries and the Anglo-Saxon islands stand in the middle.   
 
[Figure 6 & 7 here] 
 
In theory, high unemployment is ambiguous regarding working poverty: if compensation is low, 
it increases the risk of poverty of the household but if unemployment is long, the concerned 
                                                 
5 This holds true everything else being equal but if high employment is attained through a lowering of job quality 
(number of hours, low pay…), a higher work intensity might not result in lower poverty risk. 
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worker is not considered employed and is therefore not included in the working poor population. 
As expected, unemployment rates do not seem to be a good explainer of working poverty 
(Figure 8): when the outliers are excluded (Greece, Poland), the correlation disappears. Some 
successful countries have low unemployment (The Netherlands, Denmark) while other have 
average unemployment (Finland, Belgium). Germany which has the second highest 
unemployment rate among the studied countries is relatively successful in keeping in-work 
poverty low.  
 
[Figure 8 here] 
 
A high minimum wage should lower risk of in-work poverty in two ways: not only does it reduce 
wage disparity of low income workers but it also could exclude workers with the lowest 
productivity from the labour market. On the other hand, by excluding some workers from the 
labour market, it can also increase the risk of poverty and in-work poverty of other members of 
their household. Figure 9 shows a negative correlation between in-work poverty and the level of 
minimum wage relative to average wage. However, the correlation is relatively weak (R2=0.10). 
Greece, the Czech Republic and Belgium are the outliers.   
 
[Figure 9 here] 
 
What other labour market institutions are related to in-work poverty? Figure 10 draws the 
correlation between average weekly hours and in-work poverty. Employees from countries with 
high rates of in-work poverty tend to work on average longer weekly hours. However, Figure 10 
also shows very dissimilar average weekly hours worked among countries that are successful in 
keeping in-work poverty low: on one hand, in the Netherlands employees average very low 
weekly hours (due to the prevalence of part-time work among women); on the other hand, 
working hours are high in the Czech Republic and Finland whereas Belgium and Denmark stand 
in-between. This shows that there are different successful strategies in order to keep in-work 
poverty low. It appears here that there is also a Dutch specificity (employment rates for women 
already showed that there was a Belgian and a Czech specificity). Figure 11 looks at another 
dimension of labour market institutions: employment protection. We use the employment 
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protection legislation index elaborated by the OECD. This index is calculated along 18 basic 
items which summarizes for each country the strictness of regulation for regular contracts, 
temporary contracts and collective dismissals. Strict employment protection is supposed to lead 
to segmentation in the labour market between insiders with protected jobs and outsiders with 
fixed-term, part-time or temporary contracts: this can have an effect on the risk of working-
poverty. On Figure 11, we see that there is a weak correlation between strictness of employment 
protection and in-work poverty: the correlation is due to the southern European countries which 
cumulate high employment protection and high in-work poverty. Without Spain, Greece and 
Portugal, the correlation would actually be reversed.      
 
[Figure 10 &11 here] 
 
In Figure 12, we look at the relationship between the average size of households and in-work 
poverty. We saw in section 1 that that the presence of dependents increased the risk of working 
poverty. The size of households is an imperfect measure of the number of dependents: it also 
takes into account the proportion of adults living alone. This should have an opposite effect on in-
work poverty since adults living alone have a greater probability of being working poor, 
especially if there are children. Figure 11 shows a positive correlation between size of households 
and in-work poverty (R2=0.19). Nordic countries and Germany have both small households and 
low-in work poverty.       
 
[Figure 12 here] 
 
Obviously, many of the variables that are related to in-work poverty are also inter-related. Table 
4 presents least squares estimation of in-work poverty risk for the EU25+ countries, weighted by 
population size. High social spending (excluding pensions) as a percentage of GDP appears to be 
a robust predictor of low working poverty. This variable is highly correlated to working poverty 
even when we include poverty rate in the equation (eq. 2): it not only explains low working 
poverty but also the better performances regarding low-working poverty relative to the ones 
regarding poverty. Women’s rate of employment is no longer significant when high social 
spending (excluding pensions) is added to the equation (eq. 4): countries with higher women’s 
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rate of employment are also the ones with higher social spending and the latter variable seems to 
better explain low working poverty. This is coherent with the theoretically ambiguous effect of 
employment on in-work poverty risk. Average size of households is the only variable that 
remains significant when social spending is taken into account (eq. 5 & 6). The household 
situation of workers seems crucial to understanding working poverty. However, interpretation in 
terms of causality is not simple because living arrangements are also a consequence of poverty 
risk: if the risk of poverty increases with the number of dependents, it is also true that the risk of 
poverty might increase the number of dependents.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
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3. Working poverty and welfare state regimes 
 
From the analysis in section 1 and 2, we see that working poverty is a result of interactions 
between three sets of institutions: labour market, household structures and social protection. 
Labour market institutions determine employment and wages; household structures, the number 
of dependents active adult support; and social protection, the level of social transfers received by 
households. These institutions interact: living arrangements are not just the result of a social 
norm; they are also altered by social protection and labour market institutions. Young people will 
leave their parental home earlier if they can benefit from housing allowances, if student 
allowances and loans are generous, and if youth unemployment is low. Older people will be cared 
by their family when retirement benefits are low. Women’s employment and divorce might also 
be related: women’s employment lowers the economic cost of divorce and give women resources 
to leave unsatisfactory marriages. These resources can also be allocated by social protection. 
Labour market and social protection interactions result in varying financial incentives to work: 
generous social protection might lower incentives to work, especially for the less productive 
workers or the ones for which working is the costlier (for example women because they have to 
care for children or parents). Social protection instruments can be specifically targeted to working 
poor and/or low pay workers in order to increase their standard of living and/or increase financial 
incentives to work. Theoretically, these instruments have an ambiguous effect on in-work 
poverty: by increasing the standard of living of low pay workers, they reduce their risk of poverty 
but by increasing financial incentives to work of low qualified workers, these transfers can 
increase work in poor household and hence in-work poverty (but not overall poverty).     
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In this section, we look at the relationships between welfare state regimes and working poverty. 
The literature on welfare state regimes is vast and expanding since Esping-Andersen’s seminal 
book, The three worlds of welfare capitalism (1990). Most of the literature consists of 
classifications of welfare states. State welfare is complex and a classification is necessary to 
reduce complexity for comparative purposes. Welfare States provisions are numerous and 
intertwined: it is therefore nearly impossible to uncover a causal relationship between a specific 
welfare state provisions and policy relevant outcomes.  
 
Which welfare regimes tackle working poverty best? The answer to this question might depend 
on which classification of welfare state regimes we choose. Given the complexity of the 
procedure, most classifications are only concerned with a limited number of countries, mostly 
OECD countries. We therefore try to expand the traditional classifications in order to include all 
the studied countries.   
 
Labour Market 
Social Protection 
Household structures 
Working 
Poor 
-   Social transfers 
  
      -   Numbers of adults 
      -   Number of dependents 
- Low-wage 
- Unemployment 
Living arrangements 
  
 
 
Separations 
Work incentives 
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Esping-Andersen’s classification of welfare state regimes is based on a decommodification index. 
The author defines decommodification as ‘the degree to which individuals or families can uphold 
a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation” (Esping-Andersen, 
1990). The level of decommodification depends on the eligibility rules of welfare state 
instruments (the more universal, the more decommodified), on the level of income replacement 
and on the range of social risks covered (unemployment, disability, sickness and old age). The 
decommodification concept takes into account both a quantitative and a qualitative dimension of 
welfare state provisions. Table 5 shows Esping-Andersen classification of our countries of 
interest. Out of the five successful countries we defined, three belong to the social democratic 
cluster (Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands) and one to the social assurance cluster 
(Belgium); the Czech Republic welfare regime was not analysed by Esping-Andersen. However, 
the decommodification index calculated by Esping-Andersen does not seem to be a good 
explainer of working poverty levels: in-work poverty risk is lower in Ireland, the European 
country with the lowest decommodification index score, than in Sweden, which enjoys the 
highest score. The decommodification index scores from 1990 should be updated before drawing 
definitive conclusions but welfare state reforms are slow and rank order of countries would 
probably not be much different today than in 1990. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
Along the line of the literature following Esping-Andersen’s classification, Peña-Casas and Latta 
(2004) identify four types of welfare regimes in the European Union: liberal (Ireland, UK), social 
assurance (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg), social democratic (Denmark, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden and Mediterranean (Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain). The authors find a clear difference between the Mediterranean welfare cluster, which has 
a proportion of working poor of 12%, with the three other clusters where the proportion is more 
of less at the same level, twice as low as in the Mediterranean cluster (around 6%). If there is 
clearly a “bad” model in terms of working poverty, the distinction between the three other 
clusters is more difficult when we look at the working poor dimension. However, the authors also 
show that proportion of unemployed poor is much lower in the social democratic cluster: the 
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social democratic welfare state copes better with active poverty (employed and unemployed) than 
the other clusters.  
 
Giuliano Bonoli (1997) points to a limit of Esping-Andersen’s approach: the later projects 
elements of two dimensions, which Bonoli classifies as “how much” and “how”, on one single 
dimension (decommodification). Boloni argues that Esping-Andersen’s classification is therefore 
based essentially on the quantity of welfare provided by welfare states and does not discriminate 
between the ways this welfare is provided. The author proposes his own two-dimension 
classification of European Welfare States. He classifies the welfare states according to the 
quantity of welfare they provide and to where they stand on the Beveridge versus Bismarck 
dimension. Bismarkian social policies are based on social insurance: the benefits are earnings-
related; entitlement is conditional upon contributions which are the base for financing. In 
Beveridgean social policies, entitlement is universal, benefits are typically flat rate and financing 
is usually based on general taxation. The author uses two indicators to capture these two 
dimensions: social expenditure as a proportion of GDP and the proportion of contribution-
financing in total social expenditure. He identifies four ideal-types of welfare state (Table 6). 
Successful countries in fighting in-work poverty are recruited in high spending/Beveridgean and 
in high spending/Bismarkian regimes: the level of spending seems more important than the way 
the spending is done. This is confirmed by Figure 13 which plots the relationship between the 
proportion of contribution-based financing and working poverty in the EU25+: there appears to 
be no correlation. In Figure 14, we use Bonoli’s dimensions to classify the EU25+ countries in 
the four ideal-types. Bismarkian (resp. Beveridgean) regimes are the ones where contribution-
based financing represent more (resp. less) than 55% of total financing. In high-spending 
countries, social spending (excluding old age) represent more than 13% of GDP. The five 
successful countries in keeping in-work poverty low belong to three different ideal-types: 
Denmark and Finland are high-spending Beveridgean, Belgium and the Netherlands, high 
spending Bismarkian and the Czech Republic low-spending Bismarkian. We also calculated 
weighted averages of in-work poverty risk for the 4 ideal-types. High spending Bismarkian have 
the lowest in-work poverty risk (5.3%) while low-spending Beveridgean regimes have the highest 
(12.2%). Bismarkian welfare regimes seem to have lower in-work poverty than Beveridgean 
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regimes but we just saw that in-work poverty is not correlated to the proportion of contribution-
based financing, so the difference is probably not robust to changing thresholds.  
 
[Figure 13 & 14 here] 
 
Conclusion  
 
It appears from this study that if countries with different welfare regimes are successful in 
keeping the proportion of working poor low, high social spending as a proportion of GDP is the 
main factor contributing to low in-work-poverty. Table 6 summarizes the individual, job, 
household and national factors contributing to in-work poverty.  
 
In terms of welfare regimes, the following conclusions can be drawn: the Mediterranean regime, 
with low social spending, low employment and large households has bad performances in terms 
of working poverty. The liberal regime, with average social spending has average performance. 
The social democratic regime with high social spending and small households has good 
performances except, relatively, for Sweden. The social assurance regime has both high social 
spending and good performances. Overall, the level of spending seems more important than the 
way the spending is done or financed.  
 
The correlation between poverty and working poverty is strong: countries with low levels of in-
work poverty are also the ones which keep general poverty low. Women’s employment rate, 
which is generally viewed as being a factor in keeping in-work poverty low, is no more 
significant when level of social spending is taken into account.  
 
The Czech Republic which has relatively low social spending is nevertheless a successful country 
in keeping in-work poverty low. According to Eurostat data, it actually enjoys the lowest risk of 
in-work poverty in the EU25+. This Czech mystery should be investigated6. Among the 
successful countries, Belgium enjoys the best performance relative to its overall poverty level. It 
is also, with the Czech Republic, the country with the lowest employment rates for men and for 
                                                 
6 The question regarding the reliability of the data provided by Eurostat should also be considered. 
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women. A successful strategy in keeping in-work poverty low might consist in excluding the 
lower productivity workers from the labour market. More analysis is needed to test this 
hypothesis. There are several alternative strategies in fighting in-work poverty. It therefore seems 
relevant to carry out in-depth analysis of successful countries. The Czech Republic model which 
has very low in-work poverty level relative to its level of social spending and the Belgium model 
which has the best performance relative to its general poverty level need further attention.   
 
 Figure 1: Risk of poverty for employed individuals by country, 2006 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
be: Belgium       pt : Portugal 
cz: The Czech Republic    si: Slovenia 
dk: Denmark      sk: Slovakia 
ee: Estonia      fi: Finland 
ie: Ireland      se: Sweden 
gr: Greece      uk: United Kingdom 
es: Spain      is: Iceland 
fr: France      no: Norway 
it: Italy 
cy: Cyprus 
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lv: Latvia 
lt: Lithuania 
lu: Luxembourg 
hu: Hungary 
mt: Malta 
nl: The Netherlands 
at: Austria 
pl: Poland   
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Table 1: In-work poverty risk by main characteristics of the employed population, 2006 
 
In % 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2006 
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Table: In-work poverty risk and share of in-work poor by household type 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2006 ; author’s calculation 
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Table 3: in-work poverty risk and share of working poor of part-time employees 
 
En % 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2006; author’s calculation 
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Table 4a & b: Low wage workers and working poor in the European Union, 1996  
  
Source: Eurostat (2000) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat (2000), author’s calculations.  
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Figure 2: Poverty and in-work poverty in the EU-25+ 
no
is
uk
se
fi
si
ro
pt
pl
at
nl 
mt
hu
lu lt 
lv
cy
it
fr
es
gr
ie
ee
de
dk
cz
be
eu15
eu25
R2 = 0.53
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Poverty (in %) 
In
-w
or
k 
po
ve
rty
 (i
n 
%
)
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Figure 3: Poverty before social transfers and in-work poverty in the EU-25+ 
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Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 4: Poverty reduction by social transfers and in-work poverty in the EU-25+ 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
Figure 5: Social spending and in-work poverty in the EU-25+ 
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Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 6: Rate of employment for women (15-64) and in-work poverty in the EU-25+ 
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Source: Eurostat  
 
Figure 7: Rate of employment for men (15-64) and in-work poverty in the EU-25+ 
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Source: Eurostat  
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Figure 8: Unemployment rates and in-work poverty in the EU-25+ 
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Source: Eurostat  
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Figure 9: Minimum wage as a % of average wage and working poverty  
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Source: Eurostat  
 
Figure 10: average weekly hours and in-work poverty in the EU-25+ 
no
is
uk
se
fi
sk
si
pt
pl
at
nl
mt
hu
lu lt
lv
cy
it
fr
es
gr
ie
ee
de
dk
cz
be
EU 15
EU 25
R2 = 0.15
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44
average weekly hours (all employees)
in
-w
or
k 
po
ve
rty
 (i
n 
%
)
 
Source: Eurostat  
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Figure 11: employment protection and in-work poverty in the EU 
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Source: Eurostat, OECD 
 
Figure 12: average size of households and in-work poverty in the EU-25+ 
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Source: Eurostat  
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Table 5: Least squares estimation of in-work poverty risk, EU25+, weighted by population 
 
 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
 *** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level 
 
 
 
 33
 
Table 5: Welfare States classifications and working poverty   
 
 
Esping-Andersen (1990) In-work poverty risk in %
Liberal 7%
 Ireland 6%
 United Kingdom 8%
Conservative 6.3%
 Italy 10%
 France 6%
 Germany 5%
 Finland 4%
Social Democratic 5.2%
 Austria 6%
 Denmark 4%
 Belgium 4%
 The Netherlands 4%
 Norway 6%
 Sweden 7%  
 
 
 
 
Bonoli (1997)
in-work poverty risk (%) in-work poverty risk (%)
High spending High Spending
 /  taxation-based 5.3 / contribution-based 4.8
Sweden 7 Netherlands 4
Denmark 4 France 6
Finland 4 Belgium 4
Norway 6 Germany 5
Low spending Low Spending
/ taxation based 7.0 / contribution-based 11.3
 United Kingdom 8 Italy 10
 Ireland 6 Spain 10
Greece 14  
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Figure 13: Percentage of contribution-based financing and in-work poverty risk, EU25+ 
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Figure 14: Welfare State classifications and successful countries in keeping in-work poverty 
low. 
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o: Successful countries in keeping working poverty low 
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Table 6: Summary of factors contributing to in-work poverty 
intensity
Individual 
 sex 0
 age +
 education ++
Job
 type of contract ++
 weekly hours ++
 number of months worked ++
 low-wage ++
Household
 Presence of children ++
 Living alone with children +++
National 
 Level of social spending +++
 Size of households ++
 Rate of employment for women* ++ / 0 *
 Rate of employment for men* + / 0 *
* these factors are no longer significant when social spending 
  is taken into account.  
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